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A number of economists have supported the taxation of speculation in financial markets. We 
examine the welfare economics of such a tax in a model of trading in a financial market where 
some agents have superior information. We show that in some cases a tax on speculators 
may actually increase speculative profits. This occurs if the speculators* benefit from less 
informative prices offsets the costs of the tax. The effect on the welfare of other agents 
depends on how revelation of information changes risk-sharing opportunities in the market. 
It is possible for the introduction of a tax to cause a Pareto improvement .
Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: G14. G18. D8‘2. D60 






















































































































































































A number of economists have promoted taxes on speculation in financial markets, for 
example Tobin (1978), Stiglitz (1988). and Summers and Summers (1988). The main thrust 
of their arguments is that speculation is largely a rent-seeking activity that either has little 
or no economic benefit, as in Hirshleifer's analysis of private “foreknowledge" of information 
that will soon become public (Hirshleifer (1971). or is even positively harmful, as in Tobin's 
critique of “destabilizing speculation” (Tobin has generally concentrated on foreign exchange 
speculation, but has also criticized equity markets (Tobin (1984)). Of course, the opposite 
point of view has been articulated as well, for example by Miller (1991) and Schwert and 
Seguin (1993) who view speculative trading in financial markets as a productive economic 
activity that promotes efficiency and innovation, and by Scholes (1981) who argues that 
securities taxes are distortionary and self-defeating as they can be largely avoided by tax­
minimizing trading strategies.
Various taxes are levied on securities trading (see Campbell and Froot (1995) and 
Schwert and Seguin (1993) for a general description). For example, the UK imposes stamp 
duty of 1 / 2% on share sales (this is due to be abolished when transactions become demate- 
rialized). Sweden had a 1% transactions tax until 1984, which was increased to 2% in 1986 
before being abolished in 1992 (Umlauf (1993)). In the US. mutual funds that derive more 
than 30% of gross income from securities sold after being held for less than three months are 
subject to the “short-short rule,” a disadvantageous tax regime (Miller (1991)). Although 
some countries have tended to reduce these taxes (e.g. Sweden and the UK), others such 
as France and the US have recently proposed to introduce or increase them: for example 
“la Taxe Tobin” was one of the elements of Lionel Jospin's election manifesto “Propositions 
pour la France” (Jospin (1996)). A similar proposal has been actively considered in the 
US. Both the US and French proposals were specifically intended to target speculation as 
opposed to trading for other motives.
Since this is an important practical problem in the economics of financial markets, it 
is desirable to investigate it analytically using the standard methods of welfare economics. 
This has not been done before, probably because of the technical complexity of modelling 
financial market equilibrium with asymmetric information and rational, utility maximizing 
agents.
However, the problem does not seem intractable. In this paper we investigate it in 




























































































describe an equity market, although in principle the analysis could be applied to other assets 
such as foreign exchange. We study the following question: does a tax on speculators always 
make them worse off in equilibrium? The answer is negative. We show that speculators 
themselves may be better off as a result of a tax. Next, we extend the analysis to address 
the related question: can a tax on speculators be beneficial? In fact, it is straightforward 
to show that a tax may be Pareto improving. Both speculators and agents who trade for 
other motives may be made better off as a result of the tax. This is true even if the tax 
revenues are wasted.
We investigate these questions in a standard rational expectations model similar to 
Kyle (1985) and Rochet and Vila (1991), but with competitive agents. Speculators receive 
private information about an asset value, and they trade with agents whose initial risk 
exposures give them a hedging motive to trade the asset. The intuition for the result is as 
follows: the tax reduces the informativeness of prices as speculators scale back their trades. 
Speculators, other things being equal, prefer less information revelation; in this case the 
benefits of reduced informativeness must be weighed against the costs of paying the tax but 
the balance may be favourable to the tax. Hedgers, on the other hand may prefer either more 
or less revelation depending on whether the “Hirshleifer effect” (early revelation of the risk 
that hedgers wish to insure makes hedging impossible, as in Hirshleifer (1971)) dominates 
the “dynamic spanning” effect (early revelation of an extraneous risk factor makes the asset 
a better hedging instrument). See Dow and Rahi (1996) and Mann and Rahi (1995) for a 
description of how these effects operate.
In this paper we analyze the costs and benefits of taxes on speculation in a static model 
without a production sector. Clearly, if asset prices can influence productive activities (for 
example, by improving the allocation of investment resources), this would tend to offset 
the effects studied here. Depending on the parameters of the economy this effect could 
be arbitrarily large or arbitrarily small (see Dow and Rahi (1996)). The more interesting 
question concerns the extension to a model with long-term and short-term informed trading. 
A tax on short-term trading may encourage speculators to focus on long-term information 
which may have superior economic value. An analytically complete study of this question 
remains an open problem (but see Subrahmanvam (1995)).
In this paper we study the impact of a tax on speculators. Although in practice it is 
impossible to distinguish perfectly between speculators and other traders, the short-short 




























































































using short holding periods as a proxy for speculative motives. This is one reason why in 
this paper we study the effects of a tax on speculators only. The other reason is to separate 
analytically the effect of a tax on speculation from a more general tax.
The paper proceeds as follows. To study the welfare effects of informed trading, we con­
sider the rational expectations equilibrium of a parametric model with price-taking agents. 
We start by showing the result in a simple case where an informed trader interacts with 
uninformed liquidity traders, but the uninformed trade is treated as an exogenous random 
variable. This device for modelling uninformed trade is standard in the literature and allows 
the results to be derived simply. However, since the exogenous liquidity trader device is 
unsatisfactory for a proper welfare analysis, we then consider the case where uninformed 
traders have an initial risk exposure that can be hedged with the security.
2. A Simple N oise-Trader Model
We consider a risky security whose value is given by the random variable v. In addition 
there is a riskless bond whose interest rate is normalized to zero.
There is a speculator with von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function Us exhibiting 
constant absolute risk aversion He behaves competitively and should be thought of as 
representing a continuum of infinitesimal speculators. He privately observes a signal ,s that 
is correlated with the asset value v. He is subject to a tax on his trades. For analytical 
tractability, the tax payment is assumed to be proportional to the square of his trade. 
Taking a position 0 s at the market price p incurs a tax payment of %0$ and leaves him 
with terminal wealth
Ws = $s (v -  p) -  ^02s . (1)
We assume that v and s are joint normal. Without loss of generality we can take them to 
be of mean zero and write:
v  =  S +  {.
where c is a normally distributed “residual” with mean zero, independent of s. The variances 
of s and c are denoted bv V, and Y, respectively.
There is also a random quantity rj of exogenous liquidity trade. The random variable 
77 is normal with mean zero and variance V^. and is independent of s and e.
Prices are set by a risk-neutral, competitive market-maker who observes




























































































the net aggregate order flow from the speculators and liquidity traders, and sets the price 
equal to the expected value of the asset, conditional on 6.
D efinition  1. An equilibrium is a price function p(6) and a trade 6g such that:
(a) 6s 6 argmax-Elf/sltestkiP]- and
(b) p = £ (u |0).
Before computing the equilibrium and proceeding to the analysis of the model, we make 
two remarks on the features of the model. First, the quadratic form of the tax payment 
may not appear natural as a description of actual taxes which are generally approximately 
linear. However, a linear function of the magnitude of the trade would not be differentiable 
at zero, since trading positions can be positive or negative. The quadratic form of the tax 
payment that we have used here is the standard wav to circumvent this problem, since it 
preserves differentiability and linearity of the solution. See. for example, Subrahmanyam 
(1995) for a similar application to a tax problem.
Secondly, the model presented here is similar to the standard models that have been 
used in the literature to analyze security market trading with asymmetric information. On 
the one hand, it is the same model as in Kyle (1985), except that the informed trader can 
condition his demand on the price and behaves competitively. Rochet and Vila (1991) also 
modified Kyle’s model to allow for conditioning on the price, although retaining a mono­
polistic informed trader. Allowing conditioning on price (generalized limit orders) seems 
desirable as, in practice, traders do not face a significant amount of execution risk (the risk 
that their orders will be executed at a price different from the current market price); and 
in any case they are able to use limit orders to prevent execution risk. Furthermore the 
execution risk in Kyle’s framework is capable of significantly influencing traders' optimal 
strategies. This is particularly relevant when exogenous liquidity trades are replaced by 
optimal endogenous trades, as we do later in the paper. As shown in Spiegel and Subrah- 
manyam (1992), execution risk can distort hedging demands perversely.
On the other hand, the model used here is precisely a rational expectations model of 
the kind studied by Grossman (1977) and Grossman and Stiglitz (1980). with an additional 
agent who is uninformed and risk-neutral.
We now proceed to solve and analyze the model. We look for a linear equilibrium of 
the form




























































































for some parameters A and p that will be determined below. Since the speculator has 
constant absolute risk aversion and normally distributed wealth (conditional on knowing 
s and p), his optimization problem reduces to choosing a position ()< to maximize the 
mean-variance criterion £(u>s|s,p) — Af-Var(ws|s,p). His optimal trade is given by
TS\ \+ T
_  (1 -  A)s-pi? 
rs Yc + r
Hence the total order flow is
( 3 )
(1 -  A)s + (rs Ve + r -  h )t) 
r s V’t + t
We conjecture that the order flow is proportional to (As + pt?). Then the coefficients on s 
and p in the above expression must lie in the proportion
A _ 1 -  A




A rsVt + t.
p = £ (» |0)
= £(u|As + pi?)
AV, (As + pi?).
a n-, + p»v.
Given the conjectured form of the price function (2), it follows that
(d)
AJV. + pJV, = AV„ (5)
From (4) and (5), one can solve directly for A and p. This shows:
PROPOSITION 2.1. There exists a unique linear equilibrium. The price function is
p = As + pi?,
the equilibrium holding of the speculator is
„ ( l - A ) s - p t ?
0S = ------7̂ —------,rsv ( + t



























































































6 = (r5Vf + t )VvV ,- ' ( \ s + m ).
where
A =
1 S + (rsV, + r )2l„
and
_ V,(rs \', + r)
^  Vs +  ( r s V e +  t )2 \ 'v
The market-maker learns (Xs + px) from observing the order flow and sets the price 
equal to it. The ratio £ is strictly decreasing in r: a tax on informed trading makes the 
order flow less revealing.
We now consider the effect of the tax on the speculator’s equilibrium expected utility. 
The speculator’s wealth is not normally distributed ex ante since it is a quadratic form of 
normal random variables: in ( 1 ). the value of the asset v , the price p, and the optimal trade 
$s are all normal random variables. Notice that when the agent chooses his portfolio #5 . he 
conditions on his signal and he takes price as given, so his wealth is normally distributed 
given his information and given any choice of 6s- Hence when deriving 6s we were able to 
use the standard mean-variance certainty-equivalent as the objective. When calculating the 
agent’s ex ante expected utility, however, we must regard the price and trading position as 
random. The speculator’s expected utility is
EUs(u>s) = £ [—exp(—rstns )]
= -£ ^ £ [e x p (-r5tus)|s,p]] (6)
= - E  [exp (~ r s [£(tns|s,p) -  yV ar(u 'S|s ,p ) j) ] .
Substituting (1) and (3) we obtain:
EUs(ws) = - £ [ e x p ( - - y ^ ( r s V'« + r))],
which, bv a standard formula (given in the Appendix as Lemma A.l), is an increasing 
monotonie transformation of (rsV£ + r)Var(Ss). Now, using Proposition 2.1 and (5),
(rsV( + t  )Var( 0 s) = (1 -  A)2V .+ /i2V’B
T sV , +  T
( l-A )V .
rsV, + t 
(rsVe + T)V,Vy





























































































Evaluating this at r  = 0, we get the following result:
P roposition  2.2. Introducing a  small tax on speculators will make them better off if and 
only if
We can also solve for the tax rate that is optimal for the speculators. Setting = 0 and 
solving for r. we obtain
The intuition underlying the result is not difficult to see. If one regards the information 
of all agents in the economy as given, then a tax on any one class of agents will tend to 
make them worse off. However, in this case there is the offsetting effect that taxing the 
speculators makes them reduce the scale of their trades, resulting in a less informative 
price in equilibrium and increasing their informational advantage over other agents. The 
condition on the parameters in Proposition 2.2 can be interpreted as follows: if the order 
flow reveals “too much” information, either because speculators trade aggressively (low risk 
aversion rs  or low residual risk c) or because the noise trade is small in magnitude (low 
V,), a tax can benefit speculators by making the order flow less revealing.
The result would not hold if there were a monopolistic informed trader, since unlike 
competitive speculators he could optimally control the informativeness of prices regardless 
of taxes. In our model, there is an externality since an individual informed trader does 
not consider the effect his trade will have on increasing information revelation and thereby 
lowering the profits of others. With oligopolistic informed traders (for example with Cournot 
oligopoly) one could presumably derive a similar result. However we have not explored this 
case since it is well-known that with imperfect competition one can easily obtain effects 
that would be perverse in the perfectly competitive case.
3. A M odel w ith R ational Traders
In this section we describe a modified version of the model in which all traders maximize 




























































































with terminal wealth given by (1). There are two other agents who trade for hedging reasons. 
The initial endowment of hedger 1 is ci = xz. where a is a random variable representing a 
risk factor that is correlated with the asset payoff, and x is the exposure to this risk factor. 
We assume that x is unknown to other agents, hence it is itself a random variable. After 
privately observing x, the hedger trades an amount 8\ which results in net wealth
u; = xx + 0i( r  -  p).
Hedger 2’s endowment is simply t : = z. and he trades 0 2 to realize terminal wealth
till =  - +  r — p).
Agent i (i = 5,1 ,2) has a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function V, with constant 
absolute risk aversion r,. All agents take prices as given.
In this model, the “noise” that prevents equilibrium from being fully revealing arises 
from the trading of hedger 1. This agent trades a random amount which depends on his 
privately observed endowment shock x. The endowment shock could be interpreted as a 
liquidity shock suffered by the agent, resulting in a need to rebalance his portfolio. Unlike 
the noise trade in the model of the previous section, this hedging trade results from hedger 
1 maximizing utility and making inferences like any other rational trader. Hedger 2 also 
trades rationally.
The model presented here, with two hedgers, one with a stochastic risk exposure and 
one with a fixed exposure, is similar to the model used by Dow and Rahi (1996) to study 
the feedback effect of stock prices on real investment. This formulation is chosen because 
it is the simplest one for computational purposes that is also rich enough analytically. If 
hedger 2 were dropped from the model, the only hedging trade would come from hedger 1 
and he would be perfectly informed in equilibrium. On the other hand if hedger 2’s risk 
exposure were also stochastic, it would be impossible to solve the model in dosed form.
We assume that s,c ,z and x are jointly normally distributed with mean zero. The 
endowment shock x is independent of all the other random variables, while by construction 
the signal s and the residual c are mutually independent. The endowment risk factor c 
is correlated with the asset payoff v. We take the covariance of z with the signal s to be 
nonnegative (without loss of generality) and its covariance with the residual c to be nonzero 
(otherwise, equilibrium is necessarily fully revealing). To simplify the exposition we assume 




























































































We denote the variance of a random variable g by Vs. its covariance with another 
random variable h by Vgk, its regression coefficient on h (the “beta” of g with respect to 
h) by 0gh := and their correlation by pgi,. To summarize our assumptions on
correlations, 1 >  0 and Vxt > 0. We also assume that
r?V”,H  < 1 . (7)
This turns out to be a necessary and sufficient condition for the expected utility of hedger 1 
to be well-defined.
The market-maker observes the aggregate order flow 9 = 6s + 9\ + 02* and sets the 
price equal to the conditional expectation of the asset payoff given the order flow,
P = E{ v\0).
For agents i = 5 ,1 ,2 . we define X, to be the information observed by t, i.c. his private 
information together with the price p. Accordingly, I s  = (s.p), X\ = (x,p) and lo = p.
D efinition  2. An equilibrium is a price function p(0) and a trade 9, for each agent i = 
5,1,2, such that:
(a) 9{ € argm axE[Ui(wi)\Xl], and
(b) p = E(v\0).
We look for an equilibrium with a linear price function
p = Xs -f px.
Note that (provided A and p are both nonzero) the speculator and hedger 1 have the same 
information in equilibrium: knowing p and his own signal ,s. the speculator can Infer hedger 
l ’s risk exposure x. and similarly hedger 1, who knows j , can infer s. The market-maker 
and hedger 2, on the other hand, are unable to isolate 5 from x.
Analogous to (6) agent i’s expected utility is
£[ ~exp(— = —£[exp( —rj£j)],
where




























































































In general we can write
= e( + 8 ,( v - p ) ~  j f f ; .
where the endowment e, is zero for the speculator, xz for hedger 1 . and z for hedger 2: and 
the tax rate r, is t for the speculator and zero for the hedgers. Then,
£, = £ (e i|I ,)  + 8, j£(v|Zt-) -  p] -  ^  [var(e ,|I,) + 8] V ar(r|I,) + 20;cov(n.ej| I j ) j .
Differentiating with respect to 8f we obtain the optimal portfolio:
E(v\l{) -  p — r,cov( o.e ,|I ,) 
r;Var(u|Zj) + r* ( 8 )
PROPOSITION 3.1. There exists a unique linear equilibrium. The price function is
p =  As + fix,
the equilibrium holdings of the agents are given by 
(1 — A ) s - p xPc — ------—---------.
PSVe + T
„ ( 1 -  A )s -( /j  + riV «)i
= ---------------77------------ •
n f<
„ (l -  Aiv„ + v !t 
2 (1 -A )V , + V« '
and the order flow is
8 = 6i -  (1 -  A)/i- l /3„(As + fix).
where
, _________ V»[(p s + V|)K + r]-_________
V»[(r <? + r, )V< + r ]2 + rJV,2,V'r (rs V't + r )2
and
_ |~1 y .V «(rsU  + f)[(r s + nH 't + f]
M ~~ [(r s +  n  )Vt +  r]2 +  rJVjJ,V’r (PsVt +  r ) 2 '
The proof is in the Appendix. Since 82 is nonstochastic, the order flow is linear in 
(As + fix). The market-maker learns (As + px) from observing the order flow and sets 
the price equal to it. The price and the order flow are informationally equivalent, so that 
the uninformed hedger has the same information in equilibrium as does the market-maker. 





























































































For convenience, we study agents' welfare in equilibrium in terms of their certainty- 
equivalent wealth, j.e. the certain amount of money that gives the same expected utility as 
their equilibrium ex ante distribution of terminal wealth:
Ui := In | - £ ,Fj(u't)J 
= — — In |if[exp(-r,u’, )]j.
Notice that this does not require wealth to be normally distributed ex ante.
P roposition  3.2. The payoffs of the agents are:
Ws = è ln i+ r s ( l -  A)V,rsV< +  t
Hi = 5— In [(1 -  r?V.V,)[l + (1 -  A)V.Ve-»] + (p + r,[(l -  A)V„ + ]>2 1 1 ]
«2 =
2r
T2 [(1 -  A)Vtt + Vte]2
( 1 - \ ) V 3 + V(
This result mirrors Proposition 4.1 in Dow and Rahi ( 1996). and the proof is a straight­
forward adaptation. We are now in a position to carry out comparative statics with respect 
to the tax rate r ,  and prove the main result of this section.
P roposition  3.3. There is an open set of parameters for which a tax on speculative 
transactions leads to a Pareto improvement.
The proof, which appears in the Appendix, proceeds by identifying restrictions on 
the parameters under which each of the agents, the speculator and the two hedgers, are 
individually better off in equilibrium when a small tax is introduced on the speculators 
transactions. These restrictions are then shown to be consistent.
The speculator’s welfare can be improved for the same reason as in Proposition 2.2. 
If the speculator and hedger 1 (who perfectly infers the signal s from the price) are not 
very risk-averse, they speculate too aggressively. A tax on the speculator ameliorates this 
externality. A necessary condition for the speculator to benefit from a tax is that he be less 
risk-averse than hedger 1 (see ( 11 )).
The uninformed hedger benefits from the tax if (and only if) he prefers to be less 
informed in equilibrium, which is the case when fiZ( < 2flza. Observing a signal that is 




























































































Hirshleifer effect). This occurs when 3ZS is large. Conversely, information about 5 is valuable 
when f3ze is large, because it allows the trader to hedge endowment risk more accurately. 
If is relatively small compared to 3ZS, the Hirshleifer effect dominates: imposing a 
tax is favourable for the hedger as it reduces informed trading and makes the price less 
informative, mitigating the Hirshleifer effect.
4. Conclusions
In this paper, we have suggested a simple framework for analyzing the consequences of 
a tax on financial market speculation. We have studied the comparative-statics effects of 
a change in the tax rate on the welfare of speculators and hedgers in the market . In some 
cases, the tax can make all agents better off. Of course, we do not suggest that in reality 
such a tax would actually benefit the speculators themselves. The main contribution of the 
paper is applying a rigorous analytical framework for assessing the effects of a tax.
The analysis here considers only the impact of the tax on speculative profits and on 
risk-sharing opportunities for hedgers. We ignore all other economic effects of the tax, 
among them doubtless many that are as important as, if not more important than, the 
ones considered here. The most important extension would seem to be to consider also 
the effect of a tax on incentives to produce long-term and short-term information, and the 






























































































We first state a useful result (see. for example. Dow and Rahi (1996)):
Lemma A. l .  Suppose A  is a symmetric m x m matrix, b is an m-veclor. c is a sca­
lar. and w is an m-dimensional normal variate: w ~  A'(0, E). E  positive definite. Then 
£(exp( w T Aw + b Tw + c) is well-defined if and only if 11 -  2EA) is positive definite, and
£[exp(wTAw + bTw + c) = |I -  2EA|~^ exp[^bT(I -  2EA)-1Eb + e].




(1 — A )s — px 
rs V , +  t
(1 -  A)s -  (p -f riV „)j
cov(s,s|p)+ 
Var(s|p) + V< (9)
We conjecture that the stochastic part of the order flow (#s+Sj) is proportional to (A s+px). 
Then it follows from the above expressions that
A ________ (1 -  A)[(rs + r\ ) \\ + r]
p p[( rs + r, )V’( + t] + r, V«( r s V< + T ) '
Cross-multiplying and simplifying, we get
A _  ( rs + n  ) V, + r
P riV„(rsV« + r)'
Also, analogous to (5), we have
X2Y ,+ p2\'t = AVj. ( 10)
Now the desired expressions for A and p can readily be obtained.
The conditional moments for hedger 2, who observes only the price, are equivalent to 
the moments conditional on (A s+px). Using standard properties of the normal distribution 
(Anderson (1984)) together with (10), we obtain:
Var(s|p) = (1 -  A)V, 




























































































Substituting into (9) gives the desired formula for Oo. It is straightforward to compute the 
equilibrium order flow. |
Proof of Proposition 3.3.
Using the expression for the speculator's payoff in Proposition 3.2. it is easy to show 
that ( ^ - ) T=0 > 0 if and only if
Similarly for hedger 1, (^ • )r=0 > 0 if and only if
2 r i r |( r i  + rs)V1.V,V«( 1 -  rJVxV.)
+ ( r ir |V xV«(l ,t + VZJ) + Vs(ri + rs))
• ('• ;rs VI.V;e[2(r, + r s )V':a + r s V«] -  (r, + rs )2\'.?j > 0.
Recalling that V'st and V,s are positive, and using (7), ( ^ L)r=0 > 0 if
„ rp sV xVr„ [2(r1 + rs)V'M + r s V«]
'« < ----------------- ;----Tt-------------■ U-i)(r l + rs )-
Since A is strictly decreasing in r . we can deduce from Proposition 4.2 in Dow and Rahi 
(1996) that the uninformed hedger’s payoff Ui is strictly increasing in r  if 13:s ~(3:( | < &ss. 
which is equivalent to
It remains to show that there is an open set of parameters which satisfy the three 
inequalities above, (11), (12), and (13), as well as (7). while preserving positive definiteness 
of the covariance matrix of the models's random variables. Positive definiteness is equivalent 
to requiring that all variances are nonzero and that
PI, + Pit < l - (14)
There is an open interval of possible values for Vs consistent with (11) and (12) if and 
only if
ri^lKrV'^ f irs tx t-» [2(ri + + r .s '»]
r j — r~s  ( r i + r s )2
or, equivalently,
r'sVzt < (>? — f|)tz5-
Inequality (13) can simultaneously be satisfied if V, is sufficiently large. Inequality (14) 
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